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Rethinking Atomic Diplomacy 
and the Origins of the Cold War 
Gregory Paul Domin 
Mercer University 
This paper argues that the conflict between nuclear na-
tionalist and nuclear internationalist discourses over 
atomic weapons policy was critical in the articulation of 
a new system of American power . The creation of the 
atomic bomb destroyed the Roosevelt's vision of a post-
war world order while confronting United States (and 
Soviet) policymakers with alternatives that, before the 
bomb's use, only a handful of individuals had contem-
plated. The bomb remade the world . My argument is that 
the atomic bomb did not cause the Cold War, but without 
it, the Cold War could not have occurred . 
INTRODUCTION 
The creation of the atomic bomb destroyed the Roose-veltian vision of a postwar world order while confronting United States (and Soviet) policymakers with a new set of 
alternatives that, prior to the bomb's use, only a bare handful of 
individuals among those privy to the secret of the Manhattan 
Project had even contemplated. The bomb did not dictate a spe-
cific course of action: nevertheless , it remade the world. It did 
not cause the Cold War, but without it the Cold War would not 
have occurred. 1 The bomb 's advent was shocking even to those 
who knew of its development. But , while the United States un-
dertook a massive , high-level effort to plan for the postwar world 
' Indeed, had the atomic bomb not been completed until after postwar negotiations among 
the major powers were c.:-ncluded, there would still probably not have been a cold war. 
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(McLauchlan 1996; Gordenker 1999), relatively little considera-
tion was given to the impact of the atomic bomb. The most im-
portant reason for this was that the bomb was such a revolution-
ary weapon that political leaders were unwilling to put much 
credence in it until it was actually demonstrated. In addition, un-
certainties about its availability before the end of the war, its de-
structive power, and the quantity of bombs that could be pro-
duced persisted right up to the test detonation at Alamogordo, 
New Mexico on July 16, 1945.2 
This paper examines the conflict between nuclear nationalist 
and nuclear internationalist discourses over atomic weapons 
policy as a critical event in the articulation of a new system of 
American power. I argue that the atomic bomb did not cause the 
Cold War, but, without it, the Cold War would not have occurred. 
Orthodox View 
The Cold War, according to a conventional understanding 
largely taken for granted in the mass media and clearly the or-
thodox position within the American political establishment, was 
a confrontation between two superpowers. One, the United 
States, was intent on defending freedom---capitalist democ-
racy-globally, the other, the Soviet Union, was equally intent 
on subverting freedom in order to establishment totalitarian rule.3 
The lineaments of this narrative of the Cold War can be traced to 
some of the earliest formulations of postwar United States for-
eign policy doctrine, notably the "Long Telegram" concerning 
the sources of Soviet conduct by the diplomat (and then Ambas-
sador to the Soviet Union) George F. Kennan (dispatched in Feb-
2On the history of the Manhamm Project , see Richard G. Hewlen and Oscar E. Anderson, 
Jr., The New World , 1939/ 1946 ( 1962). On the time-line for the bomb 's development ::nd 
the uncertainties affecting it , see particularly pages 252-253 . 
3See, for example, Noam Chomsky 's sketch of mainstream political opinion in the early 
I 990's at a time when Cold War retrospectives were the order of the day (Chomsky 1992, 
9-19) . 
THE JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE 
RETHINKING ATOMIC DIPLOMACY 91 
ruary 1946) and a report on Soviet foreign policy prepared at 
President Truman's request by his assistants Clark Clifford and 
George Elsey during the summer of 1946. 
In Kennan's view, the Kremlin suffered from a "neurotic view 
of world affairs" rooted in a "traditional and instinctive Russian 
sense of insecurity" inflamed by the Marxist-Leninist doctrine of 
capitalist encirclement. Ultimately, both Russia's survival and 
the cause of proletarian revolution mandated the defeat of the 
capitalist powers. The West had done nothing to incite this para-
noia and, by the same token, could do nothing to alleviate it. It 
was not possible to negotiate with or placate Soviet Leaders, but 
they were responsive to manifestations of force (Nathanson 
1988; Leffler 1992, 108-109). Kennan offered little in the way of 
explicit policy prescriptions, but his warnings about the "subter-
ranean" methods the Soviet regime used to implement its poli-
cies were couched in a language that suggested how McCarthy-
ism at home and neo-colonialism abroad might be justified. 
Clifford and Elsey reiterated Kennan's analysis of Soviet in-
tentions and drew from it specific policy recommendations. The 
United States should expand and revitalize its military capabili-
ties and prepare its overseas bases; in particular, "it must be pre-
pared to wage atomic and biological warfare." It should not en-
tertain any "proposal for disarmament or limitation of armament 
as long as the possibility of Soviet aggression exists." Domesti-
cally, "communist penetration should be exposed and eliminated 
whenever the national security is endangered." 4 And it should 
employ its extraordinary advantage in economic and financial 
resources to "assist all democratic countries which are in any 
way menaced or endangered by the U.S.S.R." (quoted in Leffler 
1992, 132).i Thus emerged the doctrine of containment, which, 
'From the report's conclusion. reprinted in Containment: Documents on American Polity 
and Strategy. 1945-/950. edited by Thomas H. Etzold and John Lewis Gaddis (1978). 
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as it developed, emphasized , in varying proportions according to 
changing circumstances and the predilections of different poli-
cymakers, military deterrence and intervention, economic devel-
opment , political repression, and "wedge" strategies aimed at 
promoting and exploiting internal divisions among communist 
governments. These aspects of containment strategy were guided 
by the overall intention of surrounding communist governments 
with rings of hostile alliances while employing both economic 
and covert military means to weaken and, if possible, destabilize 
them. 
Among scholars, the Cold War policies of the United States 
and, above all, the narrative of ideological confrontation that 
justified them has had many defenders , from the historians Her-
bert Feis (1957-1970), Louis Halle (1967), and Arthur Schlesin-
ger (1967; 1992) to the more recent work of John Lewis Gaddis 
(1987; 1997). Schlesinger, himself an advisor to President Ken-
nedy, noted the continuity of such scholarship with the official 
views of Washington. In distinguishing between an orthodoxy he 
wished to defend and a revisionist current that could no longer 
be ignored, he wrote that the "orthodox American view, as origi-
nally set forth by the American government and as reaffirmed 
until recently by most American scholars, has been that the Cold 
War was the brave and essential response of free men to commu-
nist aggression" (1967, 23). These scholars were united m 
claiming that the Cold War was a virtually inevitable conse-
quence of two superpowers standing astride the world that were 
"constructed," as Schlesinger later put it, ''on opposite and pro-
foundly antagonistic principles ": 
They were divided by the most significant and fun-
damental disagreements over human rights , individ-
ual liberties , cultural freedom, the role of civil soci-
ety, the direction of history, and the destiny of man. 
Each state saw the other as irrevocablv hostile to its 
own essence . Given the ideological co~flict on top of 
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the geopolitical confrontation , no one should be sur-
prised at what ensued. Conspiratorial explanations 
are hardly required. The real surprise would have 
been if tQ~re had been no Cold War (Schlesinger 
1992, 54)." 
93 
The inevitability of conflict in a story centered on Soviet-
American relations, combined with an insistence that Soviet ag-
gression imperilled basic American values , served to sympa-
thetically account for, if not always to justify , those aspects of 
Cold War policies most at odds with liberal and democratic val-
ues; political repression and growth of the national security state 
and military-industrial complex at home ; and military , political , 
and economic support for friendly dictatorships abroad. 
Revisi onist (Critical) View 
In opposition to this orthodoxy has been a tradition critical of 
the motivations and worldview of United States policymakers. iii 
Historians writing in this tradition emphasize that the United 
States was in a position of unprecedented power at the end of the 
Second World War, with an economy that produced nearly 50% 
of world output; a military without equal in its technology and 
global reach ; a monopoly of atomic weapons ; and a homeland 
untouched by war. The Soviet Union , in contrast , had been dev-
astated by the Nazi offensive of 1941-43 and would need years 
to recover. In short , the United States was arguably the least con-
strained nation on earth, and the Soviet leadership had compel-
ling reasons to seek accommodation with it. Secondly , writers in 
the critical tradition have emphasized economic hegemony , the 
enhancement of state power, or both as primary motivations for 
United States policies. Economically , the United States was in-
tent on quickly reconstructing the capitalist world system and 
wished to do so on the basis of liberal trading policies - the so-
called "open door." Because the United States was then the most 
efficient producer in a wide range of high-value product lines, it 
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stood to gain the most from such a trading regime (McCormick 
1995, 47). At the same time, there were fears that if the world 
economy-particularly Western Europe's--did not soon recover , 
the United States would lapse into another depression because of 
lack of markets. Moreover, if European recovery were not aided 
by the United States , European nations might turn inwards , 
forming a trading block or blocks closed to the United States, 
and might also elect socialist or communist governments. The 
Marshall Plan was one answer to this; another was the decision 
not to support independence movements in the European colo-
nies if doing so would jeopardize prospects for the reintegration 
of newly independent countries into the world economy in their 
colonial role as raw materials suppliers and markets for Western 
Europe.iv Finally, policymakers saw in this approach the most 
reliable means to domestic political stability and the authority of 
the state at a time when the federal government was expected to 
actively manage the economy in the interests of steady growth 
and full employment. 
The Soviet Union threatened this conception of an American-
led postwar system. It was not willing to integrate its economic 
system with the West 's in exchange for postwar reconstruction 
aid. And , however awful the reality of Stalinism , the ideal of an 
economy managed by the state for the benefit of the masses ap-
pealed to many in Western Europe and in its colonies. Thus , the 
Soviet Union posed an economic and political , though not mili-
tary, threat to the postwar ambitions of the United States. In sum, 
scholars in the critical tradition have regarded the Cold War pri-
marily as the product of United States policymakers ' pursuit of 
empire , and have consequently characterized it as a multidimen-
sional set of conflicts rather than a bi-polar confrontation. v 
Orthodox and Revisionist Agreement 
There are two points about which the orthodox and critical 
traditions agree. First , interpretation matters . The narrative of 
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American conduct as a defense of liberty ( or the construction of 
an "empire by invitation" 5) has served not only to justify United 
States policies and the impact of the Cold War on the American 
state, but to position both within a laudatory view of the myth of 
American exceptionalism. The governing narrative of the Cold 
War has been, at one and the same time, a form of legitimation, a 
framework for institutional development, and a revision of 
American myth. By the same token, the critical tradition, insofar 
as it discovers in the Cold War American state a threat to Ameri-
can principles of democracy and political equality, challenges the 
existence of the national security state, the political hegemony of 
capitalism, and prevailing notions of United States leadership in 
the world. 
Secondly, most writers in both traditions find in the Cold War 
strong continuities with underlying tendencies in American poli-
tics. In the orthodox tradition this is frequently married with 
equally sharp perception of continuities linking Bolshevik with 
czarist Russia. Thus John Lewis Gaddis opens his most recent 
work with a quote from Alexi~ de Tocqueville, "There are now 
two great nations in the world, which starting from different 
points, seem to be advancing toward the same goal: the Russians 
and the Anglo-Americans .... [E]ach seems called by some secret 
design of Providence one day to hold in its hands the destinies of 
half the world" (Tocqueville 1835 in Gaddis 1997, 1). 
Interpretation Matters 
For Gaddis, as for Louis Halle before him (1967, 10), the 
Cold War was Tocqueville's prophecy fulfilled , with the United 
States standing for a Wilsonian belief in collective or common 
security and the Soviets for unilateral approach that could only 
engender insecurity in others, with both positions rooted in di-
5 A theory that applies ch:etly to the U.S. role in Western Europe; see Geir Lundestad 
(1986); 1990, 1992). 
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vergent national histories . The most obvious and important ele-
ment of historical continuity in the critical tradition is United 
States expansionism and the economic, political and cultural 
factors that account for it. Thus for Williams, "the various 
themes which went into America's conception of the freedom 
and necessity of open-door expansion, from the doctrine of the 
elect to the frontier thesis, had been synthesized into an ideology 
before Roosevelt's death" (Williams 1962, 229). According to 
this ideology domestic prosperity, equal economic opportunity 
and the maintenance of social conditions conducive to democ-
racy were all dependent on expansion. The critical tradition has 
insistently drawn attention to the underside of this: Native 
American genocide , the westward growth of slavery prior to the 
Civil War, a long string of foreign interventions stretching back 
to Jefferson 's efforts to destroy the newly independent black 
government of Haiti, and the exclusive rather than inclusive 
character of American democracy for most of the country 's his-
tory. 
UNDERLYING TENDENCIES IN 
AMERICAN POLITICS 
Temporal Development 
The emphasis on continuity by the two traditions , albeit with 
opposite value signs attached, can be compared along four di-
mensions: temporal development , temporal coordination, nature 
and degree of narrative closure , and genre. Temporal develop-
ment in both traditions is predominantly teleological. Orthodox 
accounts of the Cold War frame it as the delayed assumption by 
the United States of its role as world leader, thereby fulfilling its 
exceptionalist destiny . The Soviet Union is cast as that extraordi-
nary peril whose existence enables the United States to abandon 
one aspect of its exceptionalism - isolationism- by recognizing 
its impossibility in an economically, technologically , and politi-
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cally integrated world. The closing passage of George F. Ken-
nan 's "Mr. X" article epitomizes this. The "thoughtful observer ," 
Kennan wrote, will "experience a certain gratitude to a Provi-
dence which , by providing the American people with this impla-
cable challenge , has made their entire security as a nation de-
pendent on their pulling themselves together and accepting the 
responsibilities of moral and political leadership that history 
plainly intended them to bear" (1947 , 582) . This frees it to bring 
the blessings of liberty to other nations and to defend those 
whose liberty is in jeopardy .vi Halle is perhaps unique in embed-
ding a cyclic pattern within this teleology , according to which the 
United States stepped forward to restore a desirable European 
balance of power when the European nations were no longer able 
(Halle 1967, 1-19). Russia-ambiguously European Russia, at 
one point "a European, not an Asian power " and, at another 
point , "neither Asian nor seeming quite European , speaking a 
language not understo0d outside its confines" (pp. 4 and 12)- is 
a hybrid monster, contaminated with Mongol blood , incorrigibly 
sunk in fear and insecurity, from which America , "a nation of 
European stock" and "a culture of exclusively European descent" 
must save Europe. 
In the critical tradition , the Cold War as a period of American 
global dominance was the culmination of its capital istic eco-
nomic expansion melded with a conception of liberty intolerant 
of economic nationalism in other countries . Thomas McCor-
mick, writing from a world systems perspective , regards this as a 
general feature of the economic logic of hegemonic power : 
A single hegemonic power ... has a built-in incentive 
to force other nations to abandon their national capi-
talism and economic controls and to accept a world 
of free trade , free capital flows, and free currency 
convertibility . As the world 's dominant economic 
power , a hegemonic power has the most to gain from 
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such a free world and the most to lose from national-
istic efforts to limit the free movement of capital, 
goods , and currencies. So the preponderant world 
power is unequivocally self-interested in using its 
economic power, as workshop and banker of the free 
world, to create institutions and ground rules that 
foster the internationalization of capital. It finds it in-
herently advantageous to use its political power as 
ideologue of the world-system to preach the universal 
virtues of freedom of the seas, free trade, open door 
policies , comparative advantage , and a specialized 
division of labor (1995, 5). 
American foreign policy thus combined egoistic moralizing 
(a broadly appealing ideology) with the protection and advance-
ment of corporate interests . The Soviet threat, cast as a world-
wide communist conspiracy , was sufficiently ubiquitous and 
ominous to permit American military and covert action forces to 
be deployed as needed in the interests of the economic and po-
litical security of the system (even if, in the long run, this com-
plicated and undermined hegemony through over-extension and 
loss of credibility). Yet the critical tradition is not wedded to 
economic determinism , but has generated a variety of explana-
tions for the Cold War, including contingent political events , 
such as Roosevelt 's untimely death and the ascension to power 
of Truman and his secretary of state, James Byrnes (Yergin 1977; 
Alperovitz 1995, Messer 1982); the crystallization of a dominant 
ideology in which territorial acquisition metamorphosed into 
global economic expansion while retaining the political and cul-
tural aura of the frontier with its promise of prosperity, individual 
opportunity , and protection against state power (Williams 1962); 
and the advent of the atomic bomb as an apparently "winning 
weapon" (Berken 1980; Ungar 1992; Alperovitz and Bird 1994); 
among others. While it may seem ironic in retrospect that expan-
sionism in the Cold War context was conceived of as defense 
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against excessive state power, it was. On the one hand , of course, 
the American empire was supposed to guard the free world 
against the growth of a system based on unlimited and un-
checked state power. But more subtly, there was concern among 
government and corporate officials that the alternative to empire 
was a thoroughly planned economy and, in consequence , a 
highly regimented social and political world, because absent an 
empire this would be the only way to guaranteed a balance be-
tween production and consumption. As then Undersecretary of 
State Dean Acheson testified before a congressional committee 
in 1944, to avoid "the most far-reaching consequences upon our 
economic and social system, you must look to foreign markets." 
True, "you could probably fix it so that everything produced here 
would be consumed here, but that would completely change our 
Constitutio n, our relations to property, to human liberty, our very 
conceptions of law. And nobody contemplates that. Therefore , 
you find you must look to other markets and those markets are 
abroad ... " ( quoted in Williams [ 1973] 1992, 343). Truman made 
very similar comments in defense of his anticommunist foreign 
policy (Leffler 1992, 13). The implications of this skepticism 
about teleological explanation will be considered shortly. 
Temporal Coordination 
Temporal coordination in the orthodox and critical traditions 
emphasizes synchrony, though in the latter case this is largely 
imposed, an artifact of power rather than a consequence of 
choices, moral imperatives. or laws of historical development. 
What I mean by synchrony is the identification of an overarching 
temporal ordering of events, a master storyline which governs 
and connects the temporality of social actors globally . In mod-
ernization theory, for example, which developed as an important 
ideological counterweight to communism (Woodiwiss 1993, 39), 
all societies are lo<.-ated at some stage of economic growth whose 
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apogee is the "age of high mass-consumption ." W. W. Rostow, in 
his influential 1960 formulation, speculated that the United 
States, historically the first to reach this then highest stage, was 
moving towards post-materialist values (Rostow 1960, 4-12). 
Synchrony denotes an alignment of projects , meanings , and aspi-
rations made possible by the ideological, economic , and techno-
logical leadership of the United States as the most modern nation 
or, in the critical tradition , by virtue of its global dominance and 
the processes of economic and technological globalization that 
follow. 
Narrative Closure 
As an essential element of containment doctrine and the 
Manicheism that justified it, early Cold War narratives in the 
orthodox tradition looked forward to the complete defeat of 
communism as ideology and movement. Narrative closure would 
be brought about by the fulfillment of a "transcendent purpose" 
(Morgenthau 1964). Narrative closure projected a path of rivalry 
with an armaments race, economic competition , proxy wars in 
the contested Third World, and little latitude for negotiation . This 
path , if persisted in, would conclude in victory for the West- a 
strong form of narrative closure. For Kennan, "Soviet power , like 
the capitalist world of its conception , bears within it the seeds of 
its own decay, and . .. the sprouting of these seeds is well ad-
vanced." Of course, victory would not be automatic, but "the 
United States has in its power to increase enormously the strains 
under which Soviet policy must operate, to force upon the 
Kremlin a far greater degree of moderation and circumspection 
than it has had to observe in recent years, and in this way to 
promote tendencies which must eventually find their outlet in 
either the break-up or the gradual mellowing of Soviet power " 
(Kennan 1947, 580-582). Given that successive administrations 
did indeed remain committed to both the policies of containment 
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and its doctrinal justification, detente notwithstanding ,6 it is not 
surprising that the fall of the Berlin Wall coincided with the pe-
culiar euphoria of Francis Fukuyama 's "The End of History ?" in 
which the end of the Cold War was heralded as "the end of his-
tory as such: that is, the end point of mankind 's ideological evo-
lution and the universalization of Western liberal democracy as 
the final form of human government" (Fukuyama 1989). 
Because the Cold War American empire was, for the critical 
tradition , built upon the subversion and betrayal of American 
ideals of democracy and self-determination , its narrati ves could 
hardly end on a note of fulfillment or completion . This has been 
reinforced by the waning of faith in the progressive nature of 
history, so that even life cycle theories of declining American 
power (McCormick 1995, Brenner 1998) are hedged with doubt 
and do not open onto a necessarily better future . One way of 
coping with this, more evident in earlier writings , was the secular 
jeremiad. Among the Puritans , the typical jeremiad would attack 
a present danger by "(l ) citing a scriptural example of normal 
conditions , (2) listing a serie~ of condemnations of the commu-
nity 's waywardness and infidelity, (3) remindin g the people of 
God 's promises , and finally ( 4) assuring the listeners that God 's 
blessings will soon return abundantly " (Bush, Jr. 1988, 64). The 
1963 "Port Huron Statement" of Students for a Democratic Soci-
ety is an extraordinary example of the jeremiad 's secular vitality, 
with its evocation of childhood reverence for America 's sacred 
values contrasted with adult dismay at the discovery that they are 
contradicted by United States "economic and military invest-
ments in the Cold War status quo"; its biting criticisms of the 
depersonalization , manipulation , "loneliness, estrangement, 
[ and] isolation., of human beings against the background of "the 
6For a trenchant analys is of the limitations and eventua l breakdown of detente. see "Dis-
sent Detente . and Decline . l 968 -1976" in Tho mas McCo rmick·s America ·s Hnlf-Ce1111 1y 
(199 5). 
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horrors of the twentieth century"; and its nevertheless hopeful 
proclamation that "we would replace power rooted in possession, 
privilege, or circumstance by power and uniqueness rooted in 
love, reflectiveness , reason and creativity." 
For some, stoicism , rather than the faith in America 's civic 
religion that underlies the jeremiad provides a different kind of 
narrative closure. Thus , Chomsky concludes his early 1990s as-
sessment of the world emerging from Cold War by saying that 
"Popular forces in the United States and Europe have placed 
certain barriers in the path of state terror, and have offered some 
help to those targeted for repression , but unless they gain consid-
erably in scale and commitment , the future for the traditional 
victims looks grim. Grim but not hopeless .. .. We are faced with 
a kind of Pascal 's wager: assume the worst , and it will surely 
arrive; commit oneself to the struggle for freedom and justice, 
and its cause may be advanced" (Chomsky 1992, 64). 
A few works published in the immediate aftermath of the 
Cold War, such as Mary Kaldor 's The Imagina ry War, thought it 
was "a period of political spontaneity , when real choices can be 
made about the future" (1990 , 3) . Kaldor 's optimism was linked 
to her theory of the Cold War as a phenomenon that stabilized 
and extended systems of power in both blocs , so that, "far from 
threatening each other, [they] reinforced each other through their 
shared need for an imaginary war" (5). The theory nurtured the 
expectation that the collapse of the Soviet bloc would be fol-
lowed by the opening-up . if not dissolution , of the Western bloc 
as well. 
Since, however , most writers in the critical tradition decen-
tered the ideological-military confrontation with the Soviet Un-
ion, regarding it as means to other ends (chiefly the management 
of American allies and the domination of most of the Third 
World), the end of that confrontation did not unequivocally sig-
nal the end of the Cold War. Thus the ambiguous post Cold War 
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era is marked more than anything by new questions, especially 
about the configuration of global power among the major capi-
talist countries (and a rising few, notably China), the fate of the 
Third World as a shifting political-economic region, and the con-
sequences of deepening social polarization, as well as the possi-
ble revival of suppressed desires for genuine demo-cratization. 
Genre 
Finally, the predominant genre of both orthodox and critical 
narratives was tragedy, although with the end of the Cold War 
orthodox narratives have come to favor the heroic epic . Yet, al-
though tragedy characterized narratives in both traditions during 
the Cold War, the kinds of tragedy invoked were polar opposites, 
as Schlesinger perceptively noted. Ruing that "even America, for 
a deplorable decade, forsook its pragmatic and pluralist tradi-
tions, posed as God's appointed messenger to ignorant and sinful 
man and followed the Soviet example in looking to a world re-
made in its own image," Schlesinger acknowledged that "the 
Cold War had its tragic elements." However , "the question re-
mains whether it was an instance of Greek tragedy- as Auden 
has called it, 'the tragedy of necessity,' where the feeling aroused 
in the spectator is 'What a pity it had to be this way '-or of 
Christian tragedy, 'the tragedy of possibility ,' where the feeling 
aroused is 'What a pity it was this way when it might have been 
otherwise"' (Schlesinger Jr., 1967, 52) . For Schlesinger and 
other orthodox scholars, the Cold War was a tragedy of necessity 
caused by the Soviet regime, while critical scholars such as Wil-
liams have indeed taken a Christian view, Williams even bor-
rowing from a famous Christian in The Tragedy of Am erican 
Diplomacy: "As Oliver Cromwell spoke to England , so history 
speaks to all men: ' I beseech you, in the bowels of Christ, con-
sider that ye may i.,e mistaken"' (1962 , 13). 
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The narrative styles and commitments outlined above do not 
all, by any means, entail the assimilation of the Cold War to pre -
existing historical patterns. Orthodox narratives are unquestiona-
bly more thoroughgoing in doing so by virtue of their insistence 
on casting America and Russia as transcendent embodiments of 
good and evil. Yet, a pronounced tendency within the critical 
tradition has been to treat the Cold War as the latest chapter in 
the international development of capitalism and/or the continu-
ing expansion of America. My own research on the origins of the 
Cold War has convinced me that an emphasis on historical conti-
nuity is an obstacle to understanding its origins. It is so not be-
cause continuist theories are wholly wrong, but because, at best , 
they mistake necessary for sufficient causes of the Cold War. In 
their rush to vest a sanctified national ethos or a logic of world 
capitalist development with a precise and effective causality, 
they fail to understand the transformative, world-shattering im-
pact of the atomic bomb as a contingently necessary cause of the 
Cold War (contingent because its completion before the end of 
World War II was far from inevitable , necessary because it is 
very unlikely that any of the other factors identified in continuist 
theories would otherwise have produced a cold war). And while 
the orthodox brand of continuity has structured and legitimized a 
system of power, all models of continuity have served as de-
fenses against the cultural shock of the atomic bomb. 
In contrast to contin_uist theories, a growing tendency within 
scholarship in the critical tradition finds the sufficient causes of 
the Cold War in how top officials of the Truman administration 
and the American political establishment made sense of and re-
sponded to the advent of the bomb (Herken 1980; Alperovitz and 
Bird 1994; Alperovitz 1995; McLauchlan 1996). The account of 
the origins of the Cold War to which the remainder of this paper 
is devoted examines the conflict between nuclear nationalist and 
nuclear internationalist discourses over atomic weapons policy 
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as a critical event in the articulation of a new system of Ameri-
can power. 
ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATION 
Roosevelt's Approach to Postwar International Order 
Even before the advent of atomic weapons, World War II had 
shown Americans that they could no longer rely upon two 
oceans to isolate and protect them from wars and political con-
flicts in the rest of the world. In addition, the Great Depression 
had exposed the dangers that economic autarky and the conse-
quent reduction in trade posed to the American economy, dan-
gers which the extraordinary wartime growth of that economy 
magnified. Because military power was based on industrial 
might and technological prowess, economic autarky was re-
garded as the ultimate source of potential military threats to the 
United States.vii Thus both economic and geostrategic considera-
tions underlay advocacy of global economic liberalism. Com-
plementing this was the fact th:it the war had been fought against 
European imperialism in the name of national self-determination 
and democratic political rights. This vision of an economically 
open and politically liberal and democratic world was embodied 
in the most important early statement of Anglo-American war 
aims, the Atlantic Charter. 
As the war progressed, support for postwar internationalism 
(of various kinds) increased. For Roosevelt, however, interna-
tionalism had to be reconciled with a postwar world in which the 
principle victors in the war would become the dominant powers. 
Hence, his conception of postwar security sought to apply bal-
ance of power realism to organize the victors, chiefly the United 
States and the Soviet Union, but also in a subordinate capacity 
Great Britain and, Roosevelt hoped, China (under Chiang 
Kai-shek's Nationalist regime) into "Four Policemen" who 
would maintain world peace. As pressure grew for the estab-
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lishment of a United Nations organization, balance of power 
thinking was incorporated into planning for it in the form of the 
permanent members of the Security Council (Yergin 1977, 
46-48). At the same time, according to Gregory McLauchlan, 
collective decision-making about non-military matters by the 
United Nations was looked at as a way to "prevent the develop-
ment of spheres and blocs ( excepting, of course, the United 
States sphere and pan-American bloc in the Western Hemi-
sphere)" (1996, 52; see also Leffler 1992, 59). 
This thinking shaped Roosevelt's agenda at the 1945 Yalta 
Conference. In Europe, he sought to eliminate Germany as a se-
rious security threat in the postwar period. His approach to doing 
so stressed "industrial disarmament" to weaken Germany's 
military-industrial complex-and simultaneously to cement 
American-Soviet cooperation" (since Russia's paramount secu-
rity concern was also German rearmament) (Alperovitz and Bird 
1994). This required acceptance of a Soviet sphere of influence 
in Eastern Europe, though the vaguely worded "Declaration on 
Liberated Europe" expressed the hope that the Soviets would 
allow political democracy in exchange for assurances that Ger-
many would not rise again. In Asia, where Soviet entry into the 
war was thought essential to avoiding a "long and extremely 
costly" conclusion to the Pacific campaign, Roosevelt made con-
cessions that recognized a Soviet security buffer while receiving 
Stalin's agreement to enter the war against Japan and to renounce 
assistance to the Chinese Communists in favor of "a pact of 
friendship and alliance" with their Nationalist opponents (Messer 
1982, 42-43; Leffler 1992, 81 ). The Yalta accords also included 
resolution of a difficult impasse over the veto power in the 
United Nations (the founding conference of which occurred three 
months later). 
The postwar world envisaged by Yalta was an inclusive fed-
eration of unequal powers. Whether its limitations, and the cha!-
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lenge of reconciling its internationalist and nationalist dimen-
sions, would have led in the direction of stronger world govern-
ment or breakdown and crisis is impossible to know. Absent the 
atomic bomb, however, the postwar world would almost cer-
tainly have been built upon the Yalta agreements. 
The Atomic Bomb and Its Fateful Choices 
Roosevelt's death on April 12, 1945 came just as develop-
ment of the atomic bomb was nearly complete. At his last meet-
ing with the President on March 15, Secretary of War Stimson 
had warned Roosevelt that he would soon have a portentous de-
cision to make: 
On the question of future control [ of atomic weap-
ons], (Stimson] said, there were two schools of 
thought. One favored a secret attempt at control by 
the United States and Britain . The other proposed an 
international effort based on free interchange of sci-
entific information and free access to the laboratories 
of the world: Stimson told the President these things 
had to be settled before the first bomb was used and 
that the White House must be ready with a public 
statement at that time (Hewlett and Anderson 1962, 
340). 
Truman, who was not told about the about the bomb until af-
ter he became President, inherited this question. It recurred at 
several critical junctures during the first 15 months of his ad-
ministration-whether, how, and when to approach the Soviets; 
whether to use the bomb against Japan, and if so, how; whether 
to negotiate a cooperative international control agreement under 
the aegis of the United Nations or engage in a nuclear arms race . 
By the summer of 1946, the administration was clearly commit-
ted to the retention of nuclear supremacy at whatever cost , but 
until then, the issue was debated with an intensity that the poli-
tics of the Cold War subsequently obscured . 
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Proponents of nuclear internationalism argued that humanity 
faced a stark choice between international control and another 
arms race leading to a war of incomprehensible , possibly civili-
zation-ending, destructiveness . In the most well thought out pro-
posal for cooperative international control , the "Acheson-
Lilienthal Plan," an Atomic Development Authority would exer-
cise monopoly control of the dangerous aspects of atomic energy 
while private and national institutions were permitted to develop 
its safer ones , including scientific and medical uses and the pro-
duction of electric power. The plan , discussed in more detail be-
low, deliberately emphasized the potential of such an agency to 
foster the balanced economic and scientific development of 
atomic energy globally. Proponents of nuclear nationalism , in 
contrast, held that the gravest danger to America and American 
values lay in the possibility that a totalitarian regime might gain 
an advantage in atomic weaponry. To prevent this danger re-
quired that America dominate any process of disarmament and 
international control, failing which it must do whatever was re-
quired to retain a decisive advantage in atomic technology and 
armaments. 
The first identifiable stage in the administration 's atomic 
policy became known as "atomic diplomacy "- an attempt to use 
the implied threat of the atomic bomb to coerce extraordinary, 
otherwise unobtainable , concessions from the Soviets. Atomic 
diplomacy may, in part , have been a response to a domestic po-
litical climate increasingly shaped by right-wing forces that 
found in anti-Communism a way to attack all the New Deal re-
forms they detested. "The coming election , declared Republican 
National Committee chairman B. Carroll Reece in June 1946, 
would offer a stark choice between 'Communism and Republi-
canism ,' since the ' policy-making force of the Democratic Party ' 
was now committed to the Soviet Union " (Caute 1978, 26) . By 
getting tough with the Soviets , Truman could hope to take the 
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sting out of such attacks . The Potsdam Conference, the last war-
time meeting of the heads of the Grand Alliance, was postponed 
by Truman in order that results of the atomic test could be com-
municated to him in time to affect the American negotiating 
posture with Stalin (Alperovitz 1995, 141; Sherwin 1975, 193; 
Hewlett and Anderson 1962, 352). When reports came in that the 
magnitude of the explosion exceeded all expectations , Truman's 
attitude and diplomatic objectives were transformed , and many 
of those in his inner circle were seized by grandiose dreams of 
almost unlimited power . Stimson, who subsequently became an 
advocate of cautious cooperation with the Soviets , was initially 
so moved by wor<l of the bomb 's power that "he advised Truman 
the weapon might enable the United States to force the Soviet 
Union to abandon or radically alter its entire system of govern-
ment" (Alperovitz 1995, 252). 
With the bomb's power confirmed but still secret , Truman 
and Secretary of State James Byrnes probably sought the stale-
mates that occurred on many issues at Potsdam . The historian 
Robert Messer, in his study of the two leaders , believes that 
Byrnes decided ''the overriding significance of the atomic bomb 
would only sink into the remarkably obtuse Soviet consciousness 
after its power had been demonstrated in combat against Japan" 
(Messer 1982, 111-14; Cantelon, Hewlett, and Williams 1991, 
61-62). Before leaving Potsdam, Truman foreclosed the last op-
portunity to prevent use of the atomic bombs by refusing to alter 
the unconditional surrender terms offered to the Japanese. Had 
he included assurances that the Emperor would be preserved in 
the Potsdam Declaration, assurances later provided in the sur-
render terms offered to the Japanese after the bombings , the 
Japanese might have accepted defeat (Alperovitz 1995, 292-301, 
416-419; Moskin 1996, 270-272 ; Hewlett . and Anderson 1962, 
382-405) . 
VOL. 29 2001 
RETHINKING ATOMIC DIPLOMACY 111 
diplomatic behavior. Secondly, the political establishment and 
the nation needed time to digest the significance of the bomb for 
their conceptions of a postwar world order. Thirdly , the need for 
a fundamental decision about postwar Soviet-American relations 
probably did not fully sink in until the limitations of atomic di-
plomacy became apparent, something which only occurred at the 
London Council of Foreign Ministers meeting in September . The 
illusion of the bomb as a panacea had to be shattered. Lastly, 
there is evidence indicating that those who preferred an 
anti-Soviet foreign policy feared the political repercussions of 
initiating a new era of global hostilities on the heels of the worst 
war in human history . Hence, they sought ways to test the politi-
cal waters and to shift responsibility for any breakdown in So-
viet-American relations to the Kremlin. 
Between August 1945 and the following summer the conflict 
between nuclear nationalists and internationalists sharpened . The 
implications of each were more clearly drawn in competing ap-
proaches to key questions of postwar policy. The rhetoric upon 
which nuclear nationalism would come to depend was progres-
sively unveiled during this time , with Truman 's Navy Day 
speech of late October an early example . Truman , without yet 
naming the Soviet Union as America 's enemy, characterized 
America 's atomic monopoly as a "sacred trust" required in order 
to uphold and promote the ten "fundamental principle s" of its 
foreign policy (principles he explicitly compared to the Ten 
Commandments) . Through his choice of metaphors , Truman 
sought to confer upon the United States a divine mandate . 
Winston Churchill, in his "iron curtain" speech of early March , 
1946, not only cast Russia as a grave "peril to Christian civiliza-
tion," he sought to discredit the idea of the United Nations as the 
germ of a world government through which nuclear disarma-
ment, and hence peace, could be achieved. Not only must we, he 
told his listeners, continue to rely on "the solid assurances of 
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The Potsdam Conference ended on July 31, 1945. A week 
later, an atomic bomb annihilated the city of Hiroshima, Japan. 
Two days later, the Soviet Union entered the war against Japan; 
the day after that, a second bomb destroyed Nagasaki. On 
August 14 Japan surrendered. While historians continue to differ 
about the motives for the atomic bombing, there is a consensus 
that they were not strictly military. By using the bomb the 
Truman administration sought to minimize Soviet involvement 
in the war against Japan , thus denying the Kremlin a significant 
role in its postwar occupation. Beyond this, it expected the bomb 
to "make Russia more manageable in Europe." viii 
The sudden revelation of an awesome new weapon capable of 
destroying entire cities transformed, in the words of cultural 
historian Paul Boyer, "not only military strategy and interna-
tional relations, but the fundamental ground of culture and con-
sciousness" ( 1994, xxi). Climaxing a war in which all the bellig-
erents had resorted to massive attacks on enemy civilians , the 
atomic bomb struck many as the herald of humankind's eventual 
extermination. Rather quickly, the nuclear nationalist and nuclear 
internationalist alternatives, formerly confined to the tiny circle 
of individuals aware of the bomb, and both understood as radical 
departures from pre-atomic thinking , became the center of public 
commentary and debate." 
The cultural shock of the bom b affecte d the Truman admini-
stration itself, which during the fall of 1945, vacillated between 
using the implied threat of the atom ic bomb to under gird an ag-
gressive , confrontational diplomacy with the Soviet Union and 
an alternative policy that called for building on wartime trust to 
forge enduring agreements on European matters and the control 
of atomic weapons. There were several reasons for this vacilla-
tion. Divisions within the administration itself between 
anti-Soviet hardliners and proponents of mutual accommodation 
remained unresolved and showed-up in sometimes inconsistent 
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national armaments for self-preservation," we must strive to re-
main overwhelmingly dominant in atomic weaponry, for "if no 
effort is spared, [then even after Russia develops such weaponry] 
we should still possess so formidable [a] superiority as to impose 
effective deterrents upon its employment or threat of employ-
ment by others." 
What I am suggesting here is that the extraordinarily 
Manichean language used to characterize the Soviet menace was, 
in significant part, the artifact of a nationalist response by 
American (and British) political leaders to their atomic advan-
tage. As the British scientist P. M. S. Blackett wrote a few years 
later, "when a nation pledges its safety to an absolute weapon, it 
becomes emotionally essential to believe in an absolute enemy" 
(Ungar 1992, 97). Through nuclear nationalism the United States 
conceived of itself as guardian at one and the same time of the 
illusory "atomic secret" and of the ideals of democracy and free-
dom, with the former necessary to the global defense of the lat-
ter. But one could only identify with and draw upon the power of 
the atomic bomb if one had a terrible enemy , for against any 
lesser foe its use would be unconscionable . Moreover , since the 
bomb had to be used against whole populations, it was better to 
trace the source of antagonism to the enemy 's national character, 
its very culture and history , so as to confer upon the prospect of 
genocide the morally redeeming pretense of purification . 
During this same period nuclear internationalists sought both 
to sustain hopes for global nuclear disarmament and resist efforts 
to demonize the Soviet Union. Nuclear internationalism enjoyed 
very broad, though not unanimous, support among the atomic 
scientists. In addition, a number of prominent members of 
Truman's administration , including Secretary of War Stimson 
(who , however, retired in September of 1945), Undersecretary of 
State Dean Acheson , Secretary of Commerce Henry Wallace , the 
physicist J. Robert Oppenheimer, and David E. Lilienthal (then 
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head of the Tennessee Valley Authority) either urged the admini-
stration to make a genuine attempt to reach an agreement with 
Russia for the international control of atomic energy or took part 
in developing international control proposals . It also enjoyed 
significant support elsewhere in the political establishment and, 
of course, among the public. For example , Senators J. William 
Fulbright and Millard E. Tydings both argued the necessity of 
investing real enforcement powers in the United Nations. Tyd-
ings proposed world disarmament by 1950 combined with the 
establishment of a UN police force. That he nevertheless denied 
that this was "a breach of ... our traditional sovereignty'' indicates 
the political sensitivity of this issue (Tydings 1946, 296). Ful-
bright was more blunt: a major address he gave on the topic was 
subtitled "sovereignty must give way to law" (Fulbright 1946). 
Because of this political division; because of the great fear 
the atomic bomb aroused of yet another, even more cataclysmic 
war; and because the Soviet Union had been a key ally of the 
United States in the war against fascism, it was politically im-
possible not to negotiate with the Soviets over the control of 
atomic energy. In the development of the United States negoti-
ating position for these talks, and in the actual conduct of the 
negotiations, the conflict between nuclear nationalists and inter-
nationalists reached its climax, with victory , as we know, going 
to the nationalists. Victory, in tum, has rendered the internation-
alist alternative if not invisible then seemingly incredible or im-
possible. It was not so at the time, and resurrected in the wake of 
the Cold War that followed its rejection , it bears reexamination. 
The Defeat of Nuclear Internationalism 
Of the many signs of an emergent Cold War in 1946, none 
was more important than the failure of the United Nations atomic 
energy control negotiations. These negotiations officially began 
on June 14, 194G, with the presentation of the Baruch Plan, 
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named for Bernard M. Baruch, the United States representative 
to the UN Atomic Energy Commission (UNAEC). However, the 
Baruch Plan was only the final outcome of an episodic and 
sometimes convoluted process of policy formation that stretched 
back to the visionary but abortive efforts of Danish physicist 
Niels Bohr to persuade Roosevelt and Churchill ( each of whom 
he met with in 1944) of the importance of reaching an interna-
tional control agreement with the Soviets before the bomb was 
developed and used . Both leaders rejected Bohr 's approach. 
"Bohr wanted Roosevelt to offer Stalin, in effect , an atomic-age 
modus vivendi: international control of atomic energy and 
thereby security, in exchange for the surrender of the traditional 
national secretiveness that could offer but little such security in a 
nuclear-armed world" (Sherwin 1975, 97). Instead, they agreed, 
in September 1944, that "the matter should continue to be re-
garded as of the utmost secrecy." 
Shortly after Bohr 's efforts, Vannevar Bush and James B. 
Conant, the top scientist-administrators of the Manhattan Project, 
drafted a memorandum to Secretary of War Stimson warning that 
the atomic advantage possessed by United States and Britain was 
temporary and might disappear in as little as three or four years. 
Moreover "not far in the future lay the hydrogen bomb , perhaps 
a thousand times more powerful. It promised to place every 
population center in the world at the mercy of the nation that 
struck first." In view of this, and in order to prevent a potentially 
disastrous nuclear arms race , they proposed the "free interchange 
of all scientific information on the subject under an international 
office deriving its power from whatever association of nations 
was developed at the end of the war. As soon as practical , the 
technical staff of this office should have unimpeded access to 
scientific laboratories , industrial plants, and military establish-
ments throughout the world" (Hewlett and Anderson 1962, 
329-330) . 
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A third major attempt to orient U. S. policy towards interna-
tional control was made by atomic scientists at the Chicago Met-
allurgical Laboratory (an innocuous-sounding name given to the 
Manhattan Project research center there). In June 1945, a group 
there headed by James Franck submitted a report to the Interim 
Committee, a top-level atomic bomb policymaking group , op-
posing "an unannounced attack against Japan " because if the 
United States were to be the first to release this new means of 
indiscriminate destruction upon mankind , it would sacrifice pub-
lic support throughout the world, precipitate the race for arma-
ments , and prejudice the possibility of reaching an international 
agreement on the future control of such weapons . Much more 
favorable conditions for the eventual achievement of such an 
agreement could be created if nuclear bombs were first revealed 
to the world by a demonstration in an appropriately selected un-
inhabited area. 7 
Like Bohr , the authors of the Franck Report believed that the 
prospects for intemationaJ control would be immeasurably di-
minished by the unannounced military use of the weapon. 
Throughout the process of developing the atomic bomb and 
planning for its use, a sharp contrast persi sted between U. S. 
policymakers' behavior towards their two chief wartime allies . 
The British were kept informed and , for the most part , treated as 
collaborators. Moreover , in the 1943 Quebec Agreement be-
tween the U . S. and Britain, the Roosevelt admini stration prom-
ised to consult with the British prior to using the bomb and , 
through the instrumentality of the Combined Polic y Committee , 
set out to gain a preclusive monopoly of worldwide uranium de-
posits (Herken 1980). The Soviet Union was treated with silence 
·The Franck Report was reprinted in the Bulletin of rhe Atomic Scientis ts, V. I n. l O (May 
I, 1946): 2-4 , 16. It can also be found as an append ix in Smilh (1971 ). 
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and suspicion. The Franck Report warned against the continua-
tion of this . It had little overt influence on United States ' policy. 
A fourth effort to orient U. S. policy towards nuclear disar-
mament came immediately after the bomb was used . Secretary of 
War Stimson, in ill health and about to resign , presented a 
memorandum to Truman on September 12 in which he urged an 
immediate, direct approach to the Russians about controlling 
atomic weapons , warning that otherwise "relations may perhaps 
be irretrievably embittered" leading to a nuclear arms race "of a 
rather desperate character." He added "I consider the problem of 
our satisfactory relationship with Russia as not merely connected 
with but as virtually dominated by the problem of the atomic 
bomb .... Except for the problem of the control of that bomb, 
those relations, while vitally important , might not be immedi-
ately pressing . The establishment of relations of mutual confi-
dence between her and us could afford to await the slow progress 
of time. But with the discovery of the bomb , they became imme-
diately emergent" (Alperovitz 1995, 432-433 ; Herken 1980, 26). 
Stimson 's memo precipitated a special cabinet meeting at which 
opponents of his proposal characterized it as a "give away" of 
the atomic secret to the Russians (Berken 1980, 31 ). 
Preparations for the United Natons Atomic Energy Commis-
sion (UNAEC) atomic energy control negotiations were the last 
notable effort to create a workable basis for international control. 
This opportunity came about in earl y 1946 when Secretary of 
State Byrnes named Dean Ache son chair of a committee to for-
mulate American polic y on the international control of atomic 
energy in preparation for the upcoming UNAEC talks . As Robert 
L. Beisner shows , Acheson in 1946 was far from being the or-
thodox Cold Warrior of his later career . He had been a vigorous 
supporter of Stimson at the special cabinet meeting where , ac-
cording to Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal 's notes. Ache-
son declared that he "could not conceive of a world in which we 
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were hoarders of military secrets from our Allies , particularly 
this great Ally upon our cooperation with whom rests the future 
peace of the world." Acheson had made a powerful case for 
Stimson 's views in a memo to the White House four days later 
(Beisner 1996, 327-329). 
Acheson's committee was assisted by a board of consultants 
that included David Lilienthal and J. Robert Oppenheimer. x The 
board, in the course of six weeks of intensive effort , developed a 
draft of what became known as the "Acheson-Lilienthal Plan ."xi 
The plan was presented to the Acheson committee on March 7. 
Because of concerns expressed by Bush and Groves , they added 
a final section on safeguards for the U. S. during the transition to 
international control. With that, and rather unexpectedly , the 
committee gave the report its unanimous approval (Lilienthal 
1964, 27-30). 
In clarity of expression, logical force of argument , care in 
analysis, and wedding of hope to practical possibilities , the 
Acheson-Lilienthal Plan was undoubtedly the finest statement by 
proponents of cooperative international control. Its point of de-
parture was that depending wholly on inspection and sanctions 
was futile . Recognizing this, "we have been concerned with dis-
covering what other mec1sures are required in order that inspec-
tion might be so limited that it would be practical." The com-
mittee 's answer was cooperative international development 
through an atomic development authority . The international 
authority must itself control dangerous activities , including the 
mining and processing of uranium , operation of plants for the 
production of fissionable material , and conduct of research in 
nuclear explosives, because "only if the dangerous aspect s of 
atomic energy are taken out of national hands .. . is there any rea-
sonable prospect of devising safeguards against the use of atomic 
energy for bombs .'' Direct control would eliminate "rivalry be-
tween nations" in the dangerous phases of atomic energy <level-
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opment. It would reduce the need for inspections and the politi-
cal frictions engendered by them. It would simplify inspection 
since, to take the example of mining , "not the purpose of those 
who mine or possess uranium ore but the mere fact of their min-
ing or possessing it becomes illegal, and national violation is an 
unambiguous danger signal of warlike purposes." Finally, it 
would make inspection more effective , since any nation intent on 
evasion would have to conceal the entire process of weapons 
development, and the total effort needed to carry through , from 
the mine to the bomb , a surreptitious program of atomic arma-
ment is so vast, and the number of separate undertakings so 
great, and the special character of many of these undertakings so 
hard to conceal, that the fact of this effort should be impossible 
to hide . 
The committee 's second major conclusion was that "only if 
the international agency was engaged in development and opera-
tion could it possibly discharge adequately its functions as a 
' safeguarder ' of the world 's future." Atomic energy "is a grow-
ing and changing field. If the international agency is simply a 
police activity for only negative and repressive functions , inevi-
tably and within a very short period of time the enforcement 
agency will not know enough to be able to recognize new ele-
ments of danger . .. . Those in whose hands lies the prevention of 
atomic warfare must be the first to know and to exploit technical 
advances in this field." Moreover , only an agency responsible for 
the "constructive possibilities of atomic energy" would be able to 
attract the talented and imaginative researchers and administra-
tors required , for whom "merely negative police action would 
hold no appeal" (Smith 1971, 333) . 
Having established the character and delimited the responsi-
bilities of the atomic development authority , the committee 
turned its attention to the important areas in the field of atomic 
energy where work may and should be open to private and na-
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tional institutions. It considered a variety of uses in medicine and 
scientific research to be obviously safe. And it concluded that 
power reactors would be "safe provided there were a reasonable 
supervision of their design, construction, and operation," and, 
thus, that reactor development could be opened up to private or 
national enterprise. Yet, since the fuel for these reactors would 
have to be produced by the atomic development authority, "if 
atomic power is developed on a large scale, about half of it will 
be an international monopoly, and about a half might be avail-
able for competitive exploitation." 
In the most politically sensitive section of its report, the 
committee then considered the position of the United States 
during the transition to an international control system. It ac-
knowledged that "inherent in any plan of international control is 
a probable acceleration of the rate at which our present monop-
oly will disappear," but emphasized that the process of turning 
over material assets and sharing knowledge could proceed 
gradually, and that disclosures required in the early stages "will 
not essentially alter the present superiority of the United States." 
It recommended that the transfer of "our raw material supplies; 
the plants at Oak Ridge and Hanford; the stockpiles of bombs 
now in our possession; the stockpiles of undenatured fissionable 
materials; our atomic bomb plant and laboratory at Los Alamos" 
to the jurisdiction of the Authority "will have to be very care-
fully scheduled." Similarly, "our monopoly of knowledge cannot 
be, and should not be, lost at once. There is rather wide freedom 
of choice in the actual scheduling of disclosures." However, each 
stage of the transition would require the disclosure of informa-
tion pertinent to its success (Smith 1971, 335). 
On March 17 the Acheson-Lilienthal report was sent to 
Byrnes. and on March 28 the State Department publicly released 
it. According to Alice K. Smith, public response to it was "vo-
luminous and highly favorable, although the inevitable extremes 
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of editorial comment inveighed against giving away secrets or 
dismissed the plan as admirable but visionary " (Smith 1971, 
335). The report caused great excitement in scientific circles , 
particularly since it appeared at a moment when the national and 
international situations were becoming increasingly bleak. But 
the "ray of hope" that Edward Teller glimpsed in the report was 
quickly blotted out. At practically the same moment Byrnes was 
receiving the Acheson-Lilienthal Plan , he was asking Bernard 
Baruch to represent the United States at the UNAEC. Acheson, 
Lilienthal, and Oppenheimer , the three men most identified with 
the Plan 's ideas , were all dismayed by his selection , and Acheson 
tried to dissuade Byrnes from it (Herken 1980, 159-161 ; Smith 
1971, 336-337 ; Beisner 1996, 331). Baruch was seventy-six 
years old, a Wall Street financier whose most important previous 
service in government had been as head of the nation 's industrial 
mobilization effort during World War I and as an advisor to 
Woodrow Wilson at the 1919 Versailles Peace Conference (Ger-
ber 1982, 74). He was a conservative who considered national 
security thinking and Wilsonian internationalism complementary 
approaches to foreign policy. Fearing American vulnerability in 
an atomic age and doubtful that the American people could be 
roused quickly at the first sign of Soviet violation of an Ache-
son-Lilienthal system of control, he and his associates immedi-
ately set about modifying the Plan. They wanted "ironclad pro-
tections " against the possibility of Soviet defection during the 
transition to an atomic development authority. and they wanted 
potent and inescapable provisions for the punishment of viola-
tions during and after the transition (Gerber 1982). 
Baruch exposed the dark underside of the atomic monopoly 
as a "sacred trust" in characterizing the world as under a sen-
tence of death that would be lifted only if it sought redemption in 
a pact designed by the United States and whose implementation 
was effectively controlled by it.xii The United States , he said, 
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"stands ready to proscribe and destroy this instrument, to lift its 
use from death to life, if the world will join in a pact to that end. 
"It would only do so, however, after "an adequate system for 
control of atomic energy ... has been agreed upon and put into 
effective operation and consign punishments set up for the viola-
tions of the rules of control .... " He placed particular emphasis on 
the need for "immediate, swift, and sure punishment" of treaty 
violations and insisted that there "must be no veto to protect 
those who violate their solemn agreements" (UNAEC 1946, 
4-14). Thus, "(w]hile the Soviets gave up critical information 
about their fissionable resources and their progress in 
atomic-weapons research ... the United States could retain and 
enlarge its stock of bombs, conduct its tests, and in general 
maintain its massive lead in the field" (Boyer 1994, 55). The 
language of punishment combined with abandonment of the veto 
would , as then Undersecretary of State Dean Acheson recog-
nized, strike Moscow as '"an attempt to tum the United Nations 
into an alliance to support a United States war against the USSR 
unless it ceased its efforts ' to develop nuclear weapons" (Beisner 
1996, 331-332; Smith 1971, 337-339). When Acheson and oth-
ers objected to Baruch 's alterations of the plan they had crafted, 
Baruch threatened to resign, and Truman and Byrnes sided with 
him. 
Abolition of the veto, in this instance at least, was superfi-
cially appealing, since otherwise the police power of the UN ap-
peared to be ineffectual. Thus, James Conant, envisioning a con-
trol system based on frequent compulsory inspections backed by 
an international air force, looked to an international stockpile of 
atomic bombs as the ultimate weapon against violators (Sherwin 
1985, 12). It was a utopian scheme , since it could not be effec-
tively implemented without virtually replacing national sover-
eignty with a world government. The idealists were , ironically, 
more realistic in expecting far less in the way of diminished sov-
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ereignty. Oppenheimer and others understood that the "sanction" 
for a serious treaty violation would be war or the imminent threat 
of war. As P. M. S. Blackett argued, sanctions were only mean-
ingful where their application led "(a) to the restraint of the of-
fending nation without war, or (b) to a short 'police' type of 
war." When, in contrast, "there are only two powers of compara-
ble strength in the world ... neither power can apply 'sanctions' to 
the other." Blackett apparently regarded Conant's proposal as 
either naive or insincere: "a little reflection shows the unreality 
of the suggestion. U.N.O. [United Nations Organization] is not 
an organism existing apart from its constituent nations, nor 
standing over and above the Great Powers. If the Great Powers 
fell out with each other, the existence of a stock of bombs nomi-
nally held by U.N.O. would have little effect on the situation" 
(Blackett 1946, 15; see also Edward A. Shils 1946). 
Most scholars who have studied this initial attempt at inter-
national control believe that "Baruch explicitly designed his plan 
to perpetuate the U. S. atomic monopoly" (Leffler 1992, 116; 
Herken 1980 151-191; Gerber 1982; Beisner I 996,331; Harbutt 
1986; 177-178; Weart 1988, 116-117). Some, however, have 
supported the Truman administration's view that Soviet opposi-
tion to an effective system of controls was largely to blame 
(Hewlett and Anderson 1962, 592). In the event, the talks 
quickly stalemated, and although they dragged on for months, no 
agreement was reached. 
CONCLUSIONS 
The Cold War, I have sought to argue, was not the conse-
quence of an American-led defense of political democracy and 
market economies against a totalitarian foe implacably bent upon 
expansion . Yet it was also not the inevitable result of the pursuit 
of global hegemony by the United States and the opposition to 
that, symbolic as well as substantive, offered by the Soviet Un-
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ion. Without the creation of the atomic bomb at the end of World 
War II, there could not have been a cold war. Roosevelt's foreign 
policy, embodied in the Yalta accords and in the design of the 
United Nations, treated the continuation of amicable relations 
with the Soviet Union as both a reasonable prospect and one 
necessary to postwar security. Nor did the Soviet Union suddenly 
begin behaving differently after Roosevelt's death. Stalin essen-
tially conceded United States preeminence everywhere but on 
Russia's periphery. Moreover, Soviet policy in Eastern Europe 
initially varied among countries, with representative democracies 
being accepted in Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Austria, and Fin-
land. Russia itself was devastated and, according to a United 
States intelligence report of November 1945, its government 
would be unlikely to chance a major war for at least fifteen years 
(Laf eber 1997,28).xiii It was the atomic bomb that made the ex-
traordinary anti-Soviet and anti-communist rhetoric with which 
the Cold War was declared politically possible. More impor-
tantly, the atomic bomb rendered pre-atomic conceptions of in-
ternational security obsolete. For nuclear internationalists an-
other, nuclear, war was unthinkable, and the prospect of it made 
the risks of cooperative international control worth taking. The 
nuclear nationalist response, candidly stated by Churchill, was to 
spare no effort to retain a "formidable superiority" in nuclear 
weaponry, relying on this to prevent war. Both were radical de-
partures. Past arms races had usually presaged war, and there 
were many who doubted that the prospect of annihilation would 
be sufficient to prevent another. And nuclear internationalism , 
because it entailed the diminishment of national sovereignty, ran 
counter to the powerful current of "exceptionalism" in American 
political culture. However incredible one or both appeared, there 
seemed to be no other alternatives. Once the choice was made, 
however, the sense of incredulity was concentrated, both through 
deliberate effort and as a psychological by-product of the deci-
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sion itself , almost entirely in the defeated internationalist alter-
native . For not only did an absolute weapon require an absolute 
enemy, such a depiction of the Soviet Union was obviously cru-
cial to invalidating nuclear internationalism. Thus teleological 
explanations of American history, whether the teleology is for 
good or ill, attribute to structures or to a national ethos an illicit 
authority. Narratives of national identity and purpose may well 
be indispensable, but they do not write themselves. As one 
prominent historian recently concluded, "The Cold War will defy 
any single master narrative" (Leffler 1999). 
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ENDNOTES 
;It bears mention that Kennan was unhappy with the dominant role military power came 
to play in the practice of containment. He saw the Soviet threat as political and not mili-
tary (Kaldor 1990, 39, Cho msky 1992, 23; Gaddis 1978) . 
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;;See also Raymond L. Garthoff ( 1992): "The fundamental underlying cause of the Cold 
War was the reinforcing belief in both the Soviet Union and the United States that con-
frontation was unavoidable, imposed by history " (127). And William Hyland, editor of 
Foreign Affairs, remarked of the new post-Cold War situation, "The United States does 
in fact enjoy the luxury of some genuine choices for the first time since 1945" (1990; 
quoted in Chomsky 1992, 13). 
;;;A note on terminology: The critical tradition is more commonly referred to as "revi-
sionist ," a term that has been accepted as a self-label by some scholars (for example 
Williams, who in calling himself as an "intransigent revisionist" defined the revisionist as 
"one who sees basic facts in a different ,~ay and as interconnected in new relationships" 
(Williams (I 973] 1992, 338). Never1heless, the emphasis on newness inherent in revi-
sionist has spawned, no! surprisingly, "post revisionist," a term whose referent, unlike 
revisionist itself, is cloudy and contested. It is not, in any event, sheer newness that dis-
tinguishes Cold War revisionism from orthodoxy, but rather the critique it offers of pre-
vailing beliefs and practices. 
;'The racial politics of this decision, particularly the rejection of an aggressive pursuit of 
global racial equality via the new United Nations , are examined by Brenda Gayle Plum-
mer in Rising Wind ( 1996 ). 
'Significant contributions to this tradition include William Appleman Williams, The 
Tragedy of American Diplomacy (1962); Joyce and Gabriel Kolko, The limils of Power: 
The World and Uniled Stares Foreign Policy, 1945-54 (1972); Fred Block, The Origins of 
International Economic Disorder ( 1977); Walter LaFeber, America, Russia, and the Cold 
War. 1945-1996 (1997); Mary Kaldor , Kaldor, Mary, The Imaginary War.· Understand-
ing the East-West Conflict {I 990); Melvyn Leffler, A Preponderance of Power : National 
Security, the Tn11nan Administration. and the Cold War (I 992); and Noam Chomsky, 
Towards a New Cold War: Essays on the Current Crisis and How We Got There (1982) 
and Deterring Democracy ( 1992). In addition, Gar Alperovitz's Atomic Diplomacy : 
Hiroshima and Potsdam: The Use of the Atomic Bomb and the American Confromation 
with Soviet Power ( 1965), with its thesis that the atomic bomb was used against Japan 
primanly to deny the Soviets a significant role in east Asia and to intimidate them in 
Europe, reshaped debate over the bomb and how historians approached it. {Alperovitz's 
The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb (1995) is a major revision that draws upon a flood 
of recentl y declassified documents.) 
"The world communist conspiracy, particularly the fear of widespread domestic subver-
sion. symbolized the danger of corruption and loss of control should the country tum 
inward again. Thus the political defeat of isolationism by Truman's use of Soviet menace 
rhetoric was significant beyond its success in winning passage of the British loan, Mar-
shall Plan, and other major elements of Cold War foreign policy . The defense of liberty at 
home now required its defense everywhere. And, conversely, the enthusiastic application 
of this same rhetoric against domestic progressives and radicals by conservatives, beyond 
the harm it did to lives, causes, and American values, offered symbolic protection to the 
cultural and political nation against contamination at a moment when the world as such, 
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more ominously than waves of immigrants had seemed to many Americans of earlier 
times, was pouring in. 
viiThis geopolitical thinking (Gaddis 1987, 22-25; McLauchian 1996) had ominous impli-
cations for domestic institutions and values. Many believed that, if the United States had 
to face a hostile power or powers in control of the Eurasian land mass, national 
self-preservation would require vesting the government with unprecedented authority to 
manage the economy and social life, maintain a pennanently high state of military pre-
paredness, and sharply restrict political freedoms. America, in short, would have to cur-
tail or even abandon its liberal, pacific, and democratic values. 
This assessment of the consequences of continued isolationism stood a traditional 
isolationist argument on its head . As media magnate Henry Luce put it in a 1941 mani-
festo for a liberal internationalist foreign policy, isolationists "fear that ifwe get into this 
war, it will be the end of our constitutional democracy. We are all acquainted with this 
fearful forecast C that some form of dictatorship is required to fight a modem war , that 
we will certainly go bankrupt, that in the process of war and its aftermath our economy 
will be largely socialized, that the politicians now in office will seize complete power and 
never yield it up, and that what with the whole trend toward collectivism, we shall end up 
in such a total national socialism that any faint semblances of our constitutional Ameri-
can democracy will be totally unrecognizable" (Luce I 941, 62). For a summary of the 
debate over isolationism on the eve of American entry into World War 11, see Melvyn P .. 
Leffler, 77,e Specter of Communism, pp 29-31 . 
viii For surveys of the debate among historians about the motivations for and ethics of the 
decision, see Barton J. Bernstein, "The Atomic Bomb and American Foreign Policy, 
1941-1945: An Historiographical Controversy" (I 974) (for the period 1945-1973), J. 
Samuel Walker, ''The Decision to Use the Bomb: A Historiographical Update" (1990) 
(for the period 1965-1989), and Gar Alperovitz, "Afterward" in The Decision to Use 1/ze 
Atomic Bomb ( 1995; 643-668) . 
The "manageable'' quote is attributed to James F. Byrnes . It actually appears in an 
article by Leo Szilard quoting Byrnes during a meeting he and two other physicists had 
with him on May 28. 1945, shortly before Byrnes became Secretary of State (Alperovitz 
I 995, 146; Jungk I 965, 179-180). 
;'Robert A. Divine closes his history of the triumph of internationalism during World War 
II with a passage that eloquently expresses how the grounds upon which pre-atomic 
hopes rested were swept away : 
Throughout the war the American people had looked forward to the creation of an 
international organization as the dominant feature of the postwar world. Their vision of 
the future centered in the fulfillment of Wilson 's dream . Suddenly they discovered that 
scientists working secretly in laboratories in Chicago, Oak Ridge, Hanford and Los Ala-
mos were the real architects of the brave new world . E. 8 . White caught the feeling of 
futility and despair which now blighted the triumph of the internationalists: "The prepa-
rations made at San Francis co for a security league of sovereign nations to prevent ag-
gression now seem like the preparations some little girls might make for a lawn party as a 
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thunder head gathers just beyond the garden gate. The lemonade will be spiked by light-
ning" (Divine 1967, 314-315). 
'The Acheson committee included General Leslie Groves, military chief of the Manhat-
tan Project; John J. McCloy, former assistant secretary of war; Vannevar Bush; and 
James Conant, then president of Harvard. In addition to Lilienthal (then head of the Ten-
nessee Valley Authority) and Oppenheimer, the board of consultants included Chester 
Barnard, president of New Jersey Telephone; Charles Thomas, vice-president of Mon-
santo Chemical Corporation; and Harry Winne, vice-president of General Electric (Ger-
ber 1982,71; Smith 1971,331). 
,;Its formal title was Report on the !nternauonal Control of Alomic Energy, by the United 
States Committee on Atomic Energy . A condensed version appeared in the Bulle/in of the 
Atomic Scientists, v. n. 8 (April I, 1946): 2-9 . All quotes in the following paragraphs not 
otherwise attributed are taken from the report . 
"tarry Gerber argues that this moral language was integral to Baruch 's Wilsonian 
worldlier. "Basic to Wilsonianism was a "complete faith" in what [N. Gordon] Levin 
calls "America's liberal-exceptionalism," that is, a belief that America enjoyed a moral 
superiority over other nations by virtue of its unique historical commitment to lib-
eral-capitalist values and institu tions" (Gerber 1982, 82). 
11i'LaFeber does not directly identify the intelligence report but does cite Matthew A. 
Evangelista, "Stalin's Postwar Army Reappraised" (International Security, v. 7 (Winter 
1982- 1983): 121-122). See also Thomas G. Patterson, who adds to Russia's military 
weaknesses the fact that it "had no foreign aid to dispense" and could not expect to suc-
ceed in seizing western Europe by a military thrust, since it "would [then] have to assume 
defensive positions and await crushing American attacks, probably including atomic 
bombings of Soviet Russia itself. plans for which existed" (Patterson 1988, 45). 
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